The content
The document or the measurement itself: a handover report, an extra-work agreement, a gate event. Photos go along as a hash — the image stays with you.
Vidimus replaces nothing. Your team scans, measures and signs as it does today; we put an anchoring layer underneath that captures, for every record, what was there, when, and by whom — so that nobody can change it unnoticed afterwards. Not even us.
Every organisation is checked in the Belgian company register (KBO) and signs a mandate with the Belgian eID of its director; this produces an organisation identifier (SHA-256) that appears in every bundle. Every team member gets an Ed25519 key that is created on their phone and does not leave the device, with a certificate in the company's name; Face ID is the lock. Systems — TMS, WMS, ERP, gate — sign with a system key of the organisation; a measurement source — sensor, logger, weighbridge — with its own key. Who signs is not a login name but a key with an identified company behind it.
Something happens and it is recorded: a driver signs a delivery with photo and location, a TMS forwards a CMR, a cold store reports 4.2 °C. Through the app or through one API call. Measurements only come from a measurement source that you create with a unit and a range, and they are unlimited per measurement source; everything with its own content or ID is a record, including what a system sends. You already do this today — except that it ends up in a system where anyone can change it later.
At that moment, SHA-256 is calculated over the canonical content, the hash of each attachment and the organisation identifier of the submitting company. One byte different gives a different fingerprint; the content can never be reconstructed from the fingerprint. In logbooks with personal data, a secret salt of that one record goes into the calculation: nobody can guess names by hashing them themselves, and whoever receives the bundle can still recompute the fingerprint with ordinary SHA-256.
The submitter signs the fingerprint with their key (it is created on the device and does not leave it). Every five minutes, all new fingerprints go into one Merkle tree with an external timestamp; if records of customer organisations are among them, those roots together usually also receive a qualified timestamp (eIDAS) from GLOBALTRUST within six hours, and each record is linked to it through its Merkle path. Not our word that it was 14:02 (UTC+2) — but that of an external timestamping service.
The same root goes into our ledger, which can only be added to — each entry hashes the previous one — and through OpenTimestamps into a Bitcoin block: a public register kept by thousands of parties at the same time. Any change or deletion is visible to anyone who checks, even if we were to try. Two witnesses outside Vidimus: the timestamping service (for customer organisations also the qualified one from GLOBALTRUST) and a public chain. All parties look at the same proof.
If you send originals along — photos, PDFs, CMRs — they are stored encrypted in the vault: a separate key per document, wrapped under your organisation's key. Each file is written once and also goes to storage with Object Lock (Hetzner, Germany), which does not allow overwriting during the retention period, not even at our request. If our server reads content for a dossier or bundle, that appears in your access log, which you see yourself. A replaced original stands out: its fingerprint no longer matches.
Every record gets a public check page and an evidence bundle with a script: content, batch, the submitter's signature, timestamp, qualified timestamp, ledger, Bitcoin, Vidimus's signature — recomputable with open tools, including the European Commission's software, without Vidimus. After the retention period, or when someone invokes the right to erasure, we destroy the document key: the file becomes noise, and the fingerprint still shows that something existed, when and by whom. Proof and privacy do not exclude each other.
The document or the measurement itself: a handover report, an extra-work agreement, a gate event. Photos go along as a hash — the image stays with you.
Not our server clock but external timestamps determine when: a timestamp within five minutes and, for customer organisations, usually also a qualified timestamp on the group within six hours from GLOBALTRUST, a qualified trust service provider on the EU trusted list. Nobody can give a record an earlier anchoring time, not even us. The time in the record itself is what the device stated.
Ed25519 signatures with X.509 certificates per organisation, team member and system. The key is created on the device or in the system and does not leave it, unless you let us keep a system's key; that is then stated in every bundle. Whether this is an advanced electronic signature (eIDAS Art. 26) is for the court to assess. Names in device certificates are supplied by the employer, not verified by Vidimus. The organisation itself, through a mandate that the director signs with their eID.
Every action afterwards — viewing, exporting, sharing — goes into a history on the platform that is itself SHA-256-chained.
Every ordinary database runs on four operations: create, read, update and delete. The last two are the problem — not out of ill will, but because they exist at all.
= WORD AGAINST WORD
= maths against word
Fictional examples, not customer cases. Per sector: what is anchored, and what the dispute can still be about afterwards.
01 · EQUIPMENT & MACHINE RENTAL
At departure and at return, both parties sign the condition report on a phone; photos go into the anchoring as a hash. A damage dispute becomes a comparison of two documents that can be checked to be unchanged and to have existed no later than their anchoring time.
02 · CONSTRUCTION & CONTRACTORS
The “go ahead” becomes a signed agreement on the spot, with amount and description. At the final account, there is nothing left to deny.
03 · PROPERTY MANAGERS & REAL ESTATE
Signed by both parties and anchored at move-in. At move-out, years later, it is still byte for byte exactly what was signed — including the photo hashes of every room.
04 · PORT & LOGISTICS
Every pass scan or gate movement that your gate system records is anchored straight away. All parties in the chain look at one shared proof layer instead of each at their own history.
Only if you want them to. What is anchored is the hash — a fingerprint from which the document cannot be reconstructed. If you only send the hash, the document stays where it is. If you send the original along, it is stored encrypted in the vault (a separate key per document, a key per organisation, in the EU) and you can have it erased later. Chain partners and software partners never read it; if our server reads it for a dossier or bundle, that appears in your access log.
No coin, no wallet, no consortium. We only use Bitcoin as a public clock that thousands of parties keep at the same time: the Merkle root of each group goes into a Bitcoin block through OpenTimestamps, and the proof (.ots) can be recomputed against Bitcoin itself. If the group contains records of customer organisations, the same root usually also receives a qualified timestamp within six hours from GLOBALTRUST, a qualified trust service provider on the EU trusted list. Two witnesses, no crypto.
There is no readable personal data on the chain — only hashes, and for records linked to a person, hashes with a secret salt per record, which cannot be traced back to anything without that salt. The salt is not on the chain and never on a public page; it is only in the evidence bundle of that one record. The right to erasure remains enforceable: the dossier is encrypted off the chain and is erased by destroying the key.
The evidence bundles are already yours: exportable and verifiable on their own with standard cryptography (SHA-256, RFC 3161, Merkle proof). They do not depend on our platform and remain verifiable even after a shutdown.
One REST endpoint or webhook per type of record. In a pilot, you deliberately connect one logbook; after that, your team only notices the moment of signing.
Yes, through the partner API. Your software creates a separate connection per end customer — with its own key, logbook and vault, fully separated from other end customers — and then records with that end customer's key. Usage is broken down per end customer on your meter. Your partner key manages and counts, but does not read end customers' content. Tiers, margin and the pipeline are on the partner page.
Yes, without uploading a single file. Each file gets a fingerprint (SHA-256) on your own computer; only the list of file names and fingerprints goes to us, as one record. Later you put one file or the whole folder next to it: you immediately see what is unchanged, changed, moved or gone. In the dashboard by dragging the folder in, or with a small script for those who want to work outside the browser.
Yes. Our server fetches the address and records what it receives as one record: the HTML, the response headers and the site's certificate, and a screenshot. That shows what was offered to our server at that address at that moment; what another visitor saw (login, country, personalisation) may differ, and the record says so too.
Vidimus provides evidence material, not legal advice. Every signature comes from a key belonging to the submitter, and every anchoring comes with a bundle that an expert can verify independently — stronger than a screenshot from any system.
You create your account in two minutes, no payment details needed. A director identifies your company once with the eID; then you create your first logbook in a few minutes. The first 100 records a month and the first measurement source are free. After that, you pay per record or per measurement source, with a minimum of €19 a month.
SHA-256 · ED25519 · RFC 3161 · MERKLE · OPENTIMESTAMPS / BITCOIN · AES-256-GCM · WORM