Vidimus
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VIDIMUS/LEGAL & AUDIT

What an auditor, lawyer or judge can check.

This is a translation. The Dutch version prevails.

Vidimus provides evidence material, not a verdict and not legal advice. What it provides is a chain of checkable facts: who recorded, what exactly was there, when according to an external timestamp (for customer organisations, per group, a qualified one as well), and whether anything has changed since. Each link can be recomputed with open tools, without Vidimus and without having to take anyone's word for it.

FOR THE JUDGE · 1:00 · VIDEO IN DUTCH

What was there at the time?

Eight months later, two parties show the same record, but the versions differ. The judge recomputes for themselves which version was recorded at the time, without having to take Vidimus at its word.

FOR THE AUDITOR · 1:00 · VIDEO IN DUTCH

The auditor does not have to take our word for it

Evidence comes from systems, Excel files, PDFs and emails. But when did it exist, and has it changed since? The auditor opens the verification and recomputes it themselves.

01 · THE CHAIN OF EVIDENCE

Nine links. Each link is a checkable fact.

This is the order in which a record becomes proof. Pull on one link and the rest moves with it: that is exactly what you check.

1 · Company

Checked in the Belgian company register (KBO), mandate signed with eID

The director signs a mandate with their Belgian eID. This produces an organisation identifier (SHA-256 over organisation ID, company number and time of creation) that appears on the mandate, in every evidence bundle and on every check page.

check: identifier in the mandate = identifier in the bundle
2 · Submitter

A key on the device, a certificate in the company's name

Every team member signs with an Ed25519 key that was created on their phone and does not leave the device; the certificate is issued in the name of their organisation. Two anchored statements sit behind it: the employer stated who the person is and that they may sign; the person used the same key to sign that the device is theirs. A system (TMS, WMS, ERP, gate) signs with a system key of the organisation, a measurement source (sensor, logger, weighbridge) with its own key: the signature then shows which system or which source submitted, not which person.

check: certificate chain in the bundle · manifest.signer.mandaat
3 · Record

What exactly was there

The data plus every attachment (photo, PDF, measurement) as they were submitted on the device or by the system. Not an export from the customer's database, but what was signed at the time.

4 · Fingerprint

SHA-256 over content, attachments and organisation identifier

One byte different gives a different fingerprint; the company's identifier is part of the input, so the fingerprint demonstrably belongs to one identified company. With personal data, a secret salt of that one record goes into the input, with ordinary SHA-256: the chain remains verifiable, also with the EU software, and the content cannot be guessed. Records from before 28 September 2026 use an HMAC with a key per logbook and remain verifiable that way.

check: sha256sum over the attachments and the canonical JSON
5 · Merkle root

One tree every five minutes

All new fingerprints together in one Merkle tree. The path from your fingerprint to the root is in the bundle; anyone who follows it arrives exactly at the root — but only with this fingerprint.

check: recompute the Merkle path
6 · Timestamp

An external timestamping service signs the root; for customer organisations, a qualified one as well

Not our server clock. Within five minutes, the root receives an external timestamp (RFC 3161), checkable back to a root certificate that is already on your computer. If the group contains records of customer organisations, all new roots together usually receive a qualified timestamp within the meaning of eIDAS within six hours, from a qualified trust service provider on the EU trusted list. Both timestamp files (.tsr) are in the bundle, with the root and the time.

check: openssl ts and openssl cms -verify
7 · Ledger

Append-only, each entry hashes the previous one

The root goes into our ledger. A change to one entry shows up in every entry after it — visible to anyone who puts the ledger entry in the bundle next to the previous one.

8 · Bitcoin

The same root in a public register

Through OpenTimestamps, the root goes into a Bitcoin block. Thousands of parties keep that register at the same time; changing or deleting would be noticed by everyone, even if we were to try. Bitcoin proves that the root existed before that block; the precise time comes from link 6.

check: ots verify + blockstream.info or mempool.space
9 · Verification

Who · what · when · changed?

The public check page and the evidence bundle give an outcome per check. The proof does not depend on Vidimus: the bundle belongs to the customer, the script is open, the tools are standard.

outcome: unchanged · matches — or not
02 · WHAT IT PROVES

What it proves. And what it does not.

Whoever uses Vidimus properly claims no more than this. Whoever claims more loses the very dispute they wanted to win.

What is established

  • Existence at a point in time: exactly these data and attachments existed before the Bitcoin block and, if their group received a qualified timestamp (per group, only for groups with records of customer organisations), before the time of that timestamp. For that timestamp, the legal presumption applies that the date and time are accurate and that the data to which it is bound are unchanged (eIDAS Art. 41(2)). The record is linked to it through hash calculations you can recompute yourself (Merkle path, Evidence Record). Whether the presumption also applies to the record itself is for the court to assess.
  • Unchanged since: any change afterwards — one byte — breaks the fingerprint and so every link after it.
  • Which key signed: a device key of an identified team member, or the key of a system or measurement source of an identified organisation.
  • The order: the order of the batches is fixed. Within one five-minute batch, the order follows the device's time.
  • Who co-signed: a counterparty who confirmed or disputed through a share link, with their own key on their own device.

= CHECKABLE WITHOUT VIDIMUS

What Vidimus does not say

  • That the content is true. A wrong temperature stays wrong — but anchored as “this was reported at the time”.
  • Who physically held the device. The key belongs to the person (Face ID, statements); the bundle says so honestly, and no more.
  • A legal qualification. Whether something is a delivery, an acceptance or a formal notice of default is for your legal adviser or the court to assess.
  • A legal presumption for the Bitcoin anchoring. It may not be refused as evidence because it is electronic (Art. 41(1)), but the court weighs it freely. The presumption of date and time (Art. 41(2)) rests on the qualified timestamp on the group's root; whether it also applies to a record is for the court to assess.

= WHAT YOU MUST SHOW YOURSELF

03 · FRAMEWORK

What it rests on.

Not legal advice, but the articles your legal adviser will look at. Vidimus itself is not a qualified trust service provider and not a notary; the timestamp does come from a qualified trust service.

eIDAS Art. 25

An electronic signature may not be refused as evidence in legal proceedings solely because it is electronic or not qualified.

eIDAS Art. 26

The requirements for an advanced electronic signature: uniquely linked to the signatory, capable of identifying the signatory, created using data under the signatory's sole control, and linked in such a way that any subsequent change can be detected. At Vidimus, the key is created on the device and does not leave it. Whether that is an advanced electronic signature is for the court to assess.

eIDAS Art. 41

An electronic timestamp may not be refused as evidence solely because it is electronic (paragraph 1). A qualified timestamp enjoys the presumption of the accuracy of the date and time it indicates and of the integrity of the data to which it is bound (paragraph 2). At Vidimus, groups with records of customer organisations usually receive a qualified timestamp from GLOBALTRUST within six hours, as long as the annual package with the trust service provider has room left; each record is linked to it through its Merkle path.

eIDAS Art. 46

An electronic document may not be refused as evidence solely because it is electronic.

Belgian Civil Code, Book 8, Art. 8.11

Between businesses, there is freedom of evidence: all means of evidence are admissible, and the court weighs them. A checkable evidence bundle carries more weight than a screenshot from a system that is itself in dispute.

CMR Art. 30

On delivery without reservation, there is a presumption of proper delivery. A signed, anchored delivery with photo and time records that moment — for both parties.

Articles summarised, not quoted. Vidimus does not certify the content of records and does not give legal advice; see also the terms.

04 · FOR THE AUDITOR

What you get to check.

  • The check page per record, without an account: eight checks with the actual values (fingerprint, root, time, block) and, for each check, what it means. No content; the customer shares that themselves.
  • The evidence bundle (zip): manifest, content and attachments, certificates, timestamp files (.tsr), Bitcoin proof, ledger entry, an Evidence Record (RFC 4998) for the European Commission's software, the reference script and the manual. Verifiable on its own, largely offline.
  • The dossier per record (PDF/HTML): who, what, when, chain of evidence, confirmations from counterparties, checks — for the case file.
  • The series per measurement source: a measurement gets no share link and no confirmation by a counterparty. The proof for measurements is the series of that source, each measurement with its fingerprint, in chronological order.
  • The audit package per logbook or chain: all bundles, an index and the script in one zip. And the double check: the customer's database compared with the anchors: per record, unchanged, changed or missing.
  • The access log: every time our server decrypted content (dossier, bundle, search), with the reason and at whose request. The customer sees it themselves.
  • The history of every action in the platform, itself SHA-256-chained: one changed line breaks the chain.
05 · THE HARD QUESTIONS

What a lawyer asks.

Can Vidimus itself forge or backdate a record?

Not without it being noticed. If a person signs, the signature comes from a key that does not leave their device. A connected system (TMS, ERP, sensor) holds its own key, or lets us keep it; in that case, that is stated in every bundle. Nobody can give a record an earlier anchoring time, not even us, and a later change is noticed: that time comes from external timestamps and from Bitcoin, and the ledger is a hash chain. What we could do with a stored system key: create a new record in the name of that system, with the current time as its anchoring time. If you want to rule that out, let your system hold the key itself.

The customer submitted it themselves. Can they manipulate their own proof?

They can submit wrong content — that remains “this was reported at the time”. They cannot change, withdraw or backdate that content afterwards: each record is anchored at the moment it is submitted, and a correction is a new record with its own time, next to the old one. What a counterparty co-signed through a share link, they signed with their own key on their own device.

The photo is in the bundle as a hash. Is that proof?

The bundle contains the photo itself and the hash that was anchored at the moment of recording. Anyone who hashes the photo again today and finds the same value knows that this exact file existed then and has not changed since. What the photo shows is for the court to assess — as with any photo.

Personal data in the record: can the counterparty see it?

Only a mathematical anchor is public, which lets anyone check whether your logbook was rewritten afterwards. Who you are, what you record and with whom stays within your organisation and with the people you give a link to yourself. In logbooks with personal data, a secret salt per record goes into the fingerprint; that salt is only in the bundle of that one record and says nothing about the others. Whoever receives the bundle gets it from the customer — not from us.

What if Vidimus no longer exists at the time of the dispute?

The bundle belongs to the customer and does not depend on our platform: open formats, standard cryptography, published steps. The timestamp file (.tsr) and the Bitcoin proof can be recomputed against their own source. If Vidimus stops voluntarily, customers have ninety days to take everything with them; in a bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee decides. The bundles remain verifiable.

Is a device key a qualified signature?

No. The key is created on the device and does not leave it. Whether that is an advanced electronic signature (Art. 26) is for the court to assess. The director's mandate is signed with the Belgian eID; whether that signature is qualified is shown by a check of the certificate (for example with the European Commission's DSS), not by Vidimus. We do not offer a qualified signature per record (for example through itsme) today.

More: the sixteen hardest questions — evidence in court, eIDAS, GDPR and WORM, what if Vidimus stops, sandbox and limits, key management, SLA, liability.

Verify it yourself. You do not have to take our word for it.

Download the example bundle, run the script, or put one file into the hash lab. We answer experts' questions directly.

SHA-256 · ED25519 · X.509 · MERKLE · RFC 3161 · OPENTIMESTAMPS / BITCOIN · AES-256-GCM · OBJECT LOCK