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VIDIMUS/SCENARIOS

Scenario, not a customer story — names, companies and amounts are fictional

What happens when it goes wrong.

Anchoring is only worth something on the day someone has doubts. That is why there are no features below, but the course of events: what the parties do at the moment itself, what happens three years later, and what the counterparty can check for themselves — without taking Vidimus at its word. Fictional names and companies — scenarios, not customer stories; the course of events is how the platform works. Would you rather go step by step? Walk through the cases →

SC/01 · TRANSPORT & PORT · CARRIER ↔ TERMINAL

The load that was "too late and damaged".

A haulier and a terminal share one logbook of deliveries. Three years later, a claim comes in.

day 0 · 09:41 (UTC+2)

The TMS forwards the delivery

Reference, container, registration plate, time, delivery note. Vidimus hashes, signs with the system key, encrypts the note in the vault. Five minutes later: the group is anchored and timestamped; for customer organisations, usually also qualified (eIDAS) within six hours.

record AFL-2026-0913 · sha-256 · tsa 09:46 (UTC+2)
day 0 · 09:50 (UTC+2)

The terminal confirms on the phone

Reception receives a share link and confirms: "received without reservation". Signed with a key on the terminal's own device. That confirmation is itself anchored — now it is in the file of both parties.

confirmation · counterparty's own key · anchored
3 years later

The claim — and the doubt

Claim from the recipient: too late, damaged. The carrier's planner has doubts: has that delivery in the TMS been changed in the meantime?

check · 10 sec

Open Proof

Eight checks, all green — content recomputed, place in the group, signature, Vidimus's signature, ledger, timestamp, qualified timestamp, Bitcoin. And the terminal's confirmation, with its time, is right next to it.

not changed since
outcome

What the carrier can show

The carrier does not send "our word" but the bundle and the verification link. The counterparty's insurer can have its IT people recompute it: unchanged since anchoring, with the terminal's confirmation next to it.

bundle · verification link · recompute it yourself
SC/02 · CONSTRUCTION · CONTRACTOR ↔ CLIENT

The extra work that was "never approved".

On site, the client says "go ahead". At the final account, he knows nothing about it.

site · 10:42 (UTC+2)

The order, on the spot

The site manager creates the extra-work order in the app: description, amount, photo. He signs with his own key on his phone; the client receives the share link immediately.

extra work MW-0047 · €38,500 · photo
site · 10:44 (UTC+2)

The client confirms on his own phone

Or disputes it, with a comment. That answer is also anchored, in a group that also receives a qualified timestamp for customer organisations.

client's confirmation · 10:44 (UTC+2)
final account

"We never asked for that"

The contractor opens Proof: order, photo, amount, time, and the client's confirmation of 10:44 (UTC+2) that same morning.

outcome

A signed agreement on the table

For a fixed price, the law in principle requires written agreement (Art. 1793 of the old Belgian Civil Code). The contractor can show that the client confirmed this order on site, electronically signed by both parties and verifiable by each party itself. Whether that is enough is for the court to decide.

bundle · Art. 1793 · client's confirmation
SC/03 · EQUIPMENT RENTAL · RENTAL COMPANY ↔ HIRER

The dent that "was already there".

An aerial work platform leaves in good order and comes back damaged.

departure

Condition report, together

Six photos, hour meter, remarks. Both parties sign on the phone; anchored within minutes.

handover report AFG-0182 · 6 photos · 2 signatures
return

Same discipline

Photos, hour meter, damage. Hirer absent? Then the rental desk signs and the hirer receives the share link with 24 hours to dispute — as the general terms and conditions state.

return · dent in boom lift · share link
dispute

"That dent was already there"

Two records, each unchanged since anchoring: at departure, at 08:12 (UTC+2), no damage in photo 4; at return, on Friday at 16:40 (UTC+2), there is.

outcome

No more word against word

Two photos that are demonstrably unchanged since they were recorded, each with an anchored time. The hirer and their insurer can check that for themselves on the verification page.

€18,400 repair · check it yourself
SC/04 · REAL ESTATE · SYNDIC (BUILDING MANAGER)/LANDLORD ↔ TENANT

The parquet floor that "was already scratched".

Inspection report at move-in, move-out three years later.

move-in

Room by room

Inspection report, 38 photos, meter readings. Tenant and landlord each sign with their own key; the document and the photo hashes are anchored.

PB-2026-013 · 38 photos · 2 signatures
3 years later

"I signed a different version"

Move-out: deep scratches in the parquet floor. The tenant disputes the version of the document and the date of the photos.

check

Byte for byte

The version that was signed is exactly the version in the vault; the tenant's signature is underneath; the timestamp is from the day of move-in. Photo of the living room: no scratches.

version · signature · date — everything matches
outcome

The justice of the peace can have it checked independently

The landlord can show which inspection report was signed at move-in, by whom, and that it existed no later than the day of move-in. Whether it is detailed enough and was drawn up sufficiently in the presence of both parties is for the justice of the peace (the Belgian local judge who handles rental disputes) to assess.

Art. 1730–1731 · justice of the peace · bundle

NOT A MOCKUP — THIS REALLY HAPPENED ON OUR PLATFORM

We did not sketch the transport scenario above, we ran it: a demo carrier recorded three deliveries, the batch was anchored and externally timestamped, and "Terminal X" confirmed via the share link with a key on its own device. Then we changed one word on the delivery note in the bundle — and the verification script turned red.

Fictional organisation "Demo Transport BV" · no customer data

IN COURT · 1:00 · VIDEO IN DUTCH

What was there at the time?

Eight months later, two parties show the same record, but the versions differ. The court recomputes for itself which version was recorded at the time, without having to take Vidimus at its word.

COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

Devil's advocate.

The counterparty checks the same data, but in a different order — does the hash not differ then?

No: before hashing, we bring every record into a canonical form (keys sorted, no whitespace, fixed encoding). After that, order no longer exists; the same content always gives the same bytes. That rule is in every bundle, with its name and version, and in the verification script. For files (photo, pdf) we hash the bytes themselves — there is no order to change there.

Do you have a copy of our data "as it was"? Otherwise there is nothing to compare.

Yes. On recording, the original (the canonical record and every attachment) goes encrypted into a write-once vault, for the retention period of the logbook. In case of doubt, the expert compares with what we received at the time — not with what your system exports today. And because the hash is on the ledger, we cannot change that copy unnoticed either.

Since last year, our system stores numbers differently (4.20 → 4.2). Then the data is "actually right" but the hash differs.

A hash that differs does not show that Vidimus failed, nor that the data was "actually right after all" — it proves that what is presented now is not byte for byte what was recorded at the time. What was recorded at the time is in the vault and in your bundle, with the timestamps of its group. That difference is not a problem: it is exactly the finding you want to be able to make. In practice: send the raw message from your source system, not an edited version.

What if Vidimus no longer exists in five years?

Your bundles then remain just as verifiable: standard cryptography (SHA-256, Ed25519, RFC 3161, Merkle), the verification script is included, and the timestamp file (.tsr) of the qualified trust service can be checked without Vidimus. Only the app disappears; the proof does not. That is why we deliver a bundle, not a screenshot.

Who has the keys?

Whoever signs has their own key — on their own device (browser/phone), not with us; we only see the public half and issue a certificate. Systems (TMS, gate) get a system key; a measurement source (sensor, logger) gets its own key, and only that source may measure. The original in the vault is encrypted per document; deleting after the retention period means destroying the key — the file becomes noise, and the fingerprint still proves that something was there.

How we start: your first logbook today, the first 100 records free.

Choose the record where disputes currently cost the most. Within a few weeks, your own evidence bundle is on the table — and your partner has the same one.