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VIDIMUS/VERIFICATION

Recompute it without Vidimus.

For the court-appointed expert, the auditor and the counterparty's IT department. Everything below works without an account and without our software, and offline except for one step: for Bitcoin, you look up one block in a public block explorer. You only need the evidence bundle, and you get it from the customer, not from us. Prefer DSS, the European Commission's software?

Only a mathematical anchor is public; with it, anyone can check whether your logbook was rewritten afterwards. Who you are, what you record and with whom stays within your organisation and with the people you give a link to yourself.

FOR THE AUDITOR · VIDEO IN DUTCH

The auditor does not have to take our word for it

Proof comes from systems, Excel files, PDFs and emails. But when did it exist, and has it changed since? With Vidimus, the auditor opens the verification and recomputes the proof themselves.

With the European Commission's software, without Vidimus.

00 · EU · BSI

For a court or a counterparty that prefers not to use Vidimus software. DSS is software from the European Commission; the online version is a demo environment, not an official verification. GLOBALTRUST's granted status on the EU trusted list is set by the Austrian supervisory body, not by the Commission and not by Vidimus. Every evidence bundle contains an Evidence Record (bewijs.ers, RFC 4998): the international standard for "this existed at time T and has not changed since". You check that file with the European Commission's tool or with the one from the German BSI.

  1. Ask for the evidence bundle from the party that made the record, and unzip it. You need two files: bewijs.ers and vingerafdruk-invoer.json (Dutch for "fingerprint input": the exact content that was hashed, with the SHA-256 of every attachment in it).
  2. Open the European Commission's software (DSS). For a case: the standalone version on your own computer. To try it quickly: the online demo (intended for testing, according to the Commission).
  3. Under Signed file: choose bewijs.ers. Under Original file(s): choose vingerafdruk-invoer.json. If the content is sensitive, choose to send only the digest (SHA-256): then only the fingerprint leaves your computer.
  4. Validation level: Validation with archival data (the default setting). Leave the policy on default and click Validate.
  5. Read the report. The Evidence Record shows Indication: PASSED and a POE time: the time by which the document existed (proof of existence). If the group has a qualified timestamp from GLOBALTRUST, the detailed report shows Time-stamp Qualification: QTSA for the timestamp: a qualified timestamping service with status "granted" on the EU trusted list, set by that service's supervisory body (for GLOBALTRUST, the Austrian one). If not, you see the regular timestamp (Sectigo) without that qualification, and that is all there is. GLOBALTRUST only timestamps groups with records from customer organisations, usually within six hours.
  6. Who is the company? Ask the company for the mandate signed with the Belgian eID (PDF). Load it into the same EU software; it shows whether the administrator's signature is qualified. The SHA-256 of the PDF is in the bundle (organisatie.mandaat_eid.pdf_sha256) and is itself anchored. The PDF is not in the bundle, because the eID certificate contains the administrator's national register number (the Belgian personal identification number).
  7. Attachments too? sha256sum attachments/<name> gives a value that appears in vingerafdruk-invoer.json. That way, the photos and PDFs are tied to the same recomputed proof.

Tested on 27 September 2026 with DSS 6.5 from the European Commission, on a record of Vidimus itself: Evidence Record PASSED, timestamp QTSA (GLOBALTRUST, Austria), the first hash list contains only the submitted document. Want to try it without a record of your own? The two files of a public demo record (29/09/2026, same outcome) are on the Technology page.

Offline: download the Commission's standalone application, start it on your own computer and follow the same steps; your files stay with you. Online too, the SHA-256 option sends only the fingerprint: the browser calculates it, the file itself does not leave your computer. BSI: the ER Verify Tool (TR-ESOR) is intended for experts; it requires Java 11 and a configured timestamp check, and then runs with checktool -conf config.xml -data vingerafdruk-invoer.json -er bewijs.ers. What this does not cover: who signed, and the Bitcoin anchoring; those are in step 3 below. For logbooks with personal data, the record's salt is already in vingerafdruk-invoer.json: the route works there too. Only records with personal data from before 28 September 2026 (HMAC) are checked with the steps below.

What is in the bundle.

01
  • manifest.json: all facts and intermediate values. Fingerprint, Merkle path and root, batch, signatures, timestamp, ledger entry, Bitcoin status.
  • registration.json and attachments/: the original content and attachments: photos, PDFs, CMR, measurements. Not a copy from the customer's database, but what was recorded and signed on the device.
  • Certificates of the submitter, their organisation and Vidimus, and manifest.sig: the Vidimus signature over the manifest. Timestamp file (RFC 3161, in the manifest) and gekwalificeerd.tsr (Dutch for "qualified") from GLOBALTRUST, a qualified trust service provider on the EU trusted list: only for groups with records from customer organisations, usually within six hours, and linked to your root through a Merkle path. bewijs.ers: the Evidence Record (RFC 4998) for checking software such as DSS, with vingerafdruk-invoer.json as the original: the exact bytes that were hashed. That file is missing only for erased content and for records with personal data from before 28 September 2026. bitcoin.ots, the OpenTimestamps proof to a Bitcoin block.
  • Organisation identifier: a SHA-256 that identifies the organisation. It is on the eID-signed mandate of its director, in the anchored mandate record, in every bundle (manifest.organisatie.kenmerk) and on every check page. So every signature demonstrably belongs to one identified company.
  • verify_bundle.py and VERIFICATIE.md: the reference script and this guide (in Dutch), so that the bundle explains itself, even ten years from now.

Quick: one command.

02
  • pip install cryptography rfc3161ng opentimestamps-client and then python3 verify_bundle.py bundel.zip. Without the last two packages, timestamp and Bitcoin stay at null; the Bitcoin proof follows the open standard of OpenTimestamps. For each check you get true, false or null (cannot be checked in this environment, with the reason).
  • Eight checks: content unchanged, in the anchored batch, submitter's signature, Vidimus signature, ledger entry, timestamp, qualified timestamp, anchored in Bitcoin. At the bottom, the script counts what it actually recomputed, for example ongewijzigd · 7 van 8 controles stemmen overeen · 1 niet nagerekend (the script prints in Dutch: unchanged · 7 of 8 checks match · 1 not recomputed): you then compare the Bitcoin block online yourself (witness 2 below). A null is not a confirmation.
  • If you do not trust our script, do the same by hand. See below.

By hand, step by step.

03
  • Content (what). SHA-256 per attachment with sha256sum. Build {"canon":"vidimus-json-2","org":"<organisation identifier>","payload":…,"attachments":{name:sha256,…}} canonically (keys sorted, no whitespace) and take its SHA-256. That is the fingerprint in the manifest. The organisation identifier is in the manifest (registration.org_kenmerk) and as serialNumber in signer-cert.pem: each fingerprint is thus bound to one identified company. Records from before 26 September 2026 carry canon vidimus-json-1, without an org field; the script knows both. Attachments count by name; the upload order does not matter. Shorter: sha256sum vingerafdruk-invoer.json gives the same fingerprint, because that file is exactly this object.
  • Personal data. Since 28 September 2026, records from logbooks with personal data carry canon vidimus-json-3. The object gets a fifth field, salt: the secret salt of this one record (disclosure.salt in the manifest), so that nobody can guess names or numbers by hashing them themselves. Over that object you take plain SHA-256, and here too sha256sum vingerafdruk-invoer.json is the fingerprint. The salt says nothing about other records. Older records from such logbooks (hash_type hmac-sha256) use HMAC-SHA256 with the salt as the key, over the object without the salt field; the script knows both.
  • Batch (Merkle). Walk the path: at each step, sort the two values, concatenate them as bytes, SHA-256. The end result is the root in the manifest.
  • Who. Ed25519 signature over the fingerprint, checked with the public key in signer-cert.pem; that certificate is issued by org-ca.pem. Key management 'device' means: the private key was on the submitter's device, not with Vidimus. Key management 'platform-held' means: a system key of the organisation (integration, gate, sensor) that Vidimus keeps; the signature then shows which system submitted, not which person. With a device key, two anchored statements stand behind the key (manifest.signer.mandaat): when inviting, the employer declared who the person is and that they may sign; when pairing, the person signed, with the same key, that the device is theirs. Both can be requested as records from the owner and recomputed. The organisation itself can record its identity with a mandate that the administrator signs with their Belgian eID; then 'identified with eID' appears in every bundle. If that is missing, the bundle says so plainly: declaration of authority, not independently verified.
  • When, witness 1. openssl ts -reply -token_in -in tijdstempel.tsr -text shows the root under 'Message data' and the time under 'Time stamp'. Then openssl cms -verify -inform DER -in tijdstempel.tsr -purpose timestampsign -out /dev/null -CAfile <your system's root certificates>: that checks the timestamping service's signature up to a root certificate already on your computer (outcome: Verification successful). In OpenSSL 3, openssl ts -verify can wrongly give the error 'ess cert id not found' for some timestamp files.
  • When, qualified. Only if records from customer organisations are included: the new batch roots go together into one Merkle tree, with the same rules as the batch, and its root usually receives one qualified timestamp within six hours: gekwalificeerd.tsr. Check that qualified.batch_root in the manifest is your batch root, walk qualified.path up to qualified.root, and check with openssl ts -reply -token_in -in gekwalificeerd.tsr -text whether 'Message data' is that root; 'Time stamp' is the qualified time. Look up the issuer of that timestamp file in the EU trusted list (eIDAS Trusted List): the service is listed there as QTST with status 'granted'. The root certificate is usually not on your computer, but it is in that list. The legal presumption (eIDAS Art. 41(2)) applies to that time of the root; whether it also applies to your record is for the court to assess. The precise moment of the record comes from witness 1.
  • When, witness 2. ots --no-bitcoin verify -d <root> bitcoin.ots (opentimestamps-client) names the Bitcoin block and the Merkle root that block must have. Compare it on blockstream.info or mempool.space; with your own Bitcoin node, ots verify does this in one step. Bitcoin proves that the root existed before that block; the precise time comes from witness 1. No block height in the manifest means: submitted, no block yet; download the bundle again later.
  • Ledger. SHA-256 over the canonical entry (index, prev, time, record) is the transaction number; the entry contains the root; prev points to the previous entry. Changing one entry breaks the chain.
  • Vidimus signature. manifest.sig is an Ed25519 signature over the exact bytes of manifest.json, checkable with platform-cert.pem.

Let your agent recompute it.

AGENT · OFFLINE

Claude, ChatGPT or your own agent runs the same checks and explains them. Two routes: through our server (facts, no content), or entirely without Vidimus, with the bundle.

MCP · HOSTED, NOTHING TO INSTALL
{"mcpServers": {"vidimus": {"type": "http", "url": "https://app.vidimus.be/mcp"}}}
# tools: verify_registration, get_dossier, tamper_check, explain · with a key (a read key is enough): header x-api-key
VERIFY IT YOURSELF · WITHOUT VIDIMUS
You have the evidence bundle (zip). Unzip it and run: python3 verify_bundle.py bundel.zip
Report true/false/null for each check, with the note. Do not trust any fact from manifest.json that you did not recompute yourself.
Bitcoin: compare the merkle root from bitcoin.ots with blockstream.info or mempool.space for that block.

Practise with a real bundle: voorbeeldbundel.zip (one temperature record from a demo logbook, 55 kB). Python 3 with the cryptography package is enough; for the timestamp and Bitcoin the script installs nothing, it tells you which step needs an extra tool. Or recompute files and a complete record in your browser with the hash lab: fingerprints, Merkle path and public root, without uploading anything.

What a difference means.

04
  • Content differs: a file or field is no longer what was anchored. The script names the attachment. All other checks still match, so you see not only that something changed, but what.
  • Merkle differs: the fingerprint is not in this batch. Signature differs: not signed with this submitter's key.
  • Timestamp or Bitcoin differs: the root did not exist before that time, or the timestamp file belongs to a different root. Vidimus signature differs: the manifest was changed afterwards.
  • Tested on 8 September 2026: ten files (seven photos, one JSON, two PDFs) in two different orders give the same fingerprint. One byte different in one PDF gives a different one. One byte changed in a photo in a bundle: the 'content' check differs, the others still match.

Limits, honestly.

05
  • Vidimus proves existence, time and signatory. Not that the content is true. A wrong temperature stays wrong, but anchored as 'this was reported then'.
  • A correction is never a change but a new record with its own hash and time, linked through the same reference. Both versions remain.
  • Erased content (after the retention period) leaves a bundle that still proves that something existed, who signed and when, not what.
  • Personal data: then a secret salt of that one record is in the fingerprint. The salt is only in the bundle of that record, never on the public check page. Without the salt, the content cannot be recomputed; the chain, the time and the signatures can. Records from before 28 September 2026 use an HMAC with a key per logbook and remain verifiable that way.
  • Device or platform makes no difference. SHA-256 gives the same fingerprint over the same bytes on iPhone, Android, server and laptop. Only the signing key is per device, and that is the intention.

Where to find the bundle.

06
  • One record: in the app, click the record, then the proof drawer, then 'Evidence bundle .zip'. Public, without an account: the check page of that record shows the same checks with the same facts, without content.
  • Whole logbook or chain: the ⋯ menu next to the logbook, 'Audit package': all bundles, an index.csv and the script in one zip.
  • Measurements from a measurement source: a measurement gets no share link and no confirmation by a counterparty. The proof is the series per source (GET /sources/{id}/reeks), each measurement with its fingerprint, in ascending time order.
  • Double check: to compare the customer's database with the anchors, use 'Double check' in that same menu: for each record, unchanged, changed or missing.

We answer questions from experts directly: oskar@vo-initiatives.com. See also Security and trust.